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This article recalls two periods in the author's relationship 
with Prebisch. The first relates to Prebisch's teaching at the 
University of Buenos Aires in 1948, and the second to his 
work as economic advisor to the Argentine Government 
that followed the overthrow of Perón in 1955. 
As a result of his disagreement with traditional 
economic thought, Prebisch, in his capacity as a sha per of 
Argentine economic policy in the 1930s, searched for 
solutions to the problem of the massive imbalance in 
external payments. To do so, he had to break new ground in 
matters of fiscal, foreign-exchange and monetary policy. In 
this effort, Prebisch was one of the first economists to 
recognize the Keynesian revolution and make it known in 
Latin America. On the basis of these ideas, he developed a 
point of view concerning industrialization and State 
intervention in foreign-exchange operations and other 
markets. 
In 1955 the set of proposals which he presented to the 
new Argentine Government was called the Prebisch Plan. In 
the new circumstances, Prebisch's first concern was to 
restore macroeconomic balances through an adjustment 
process. These short-term proposals encountered 
considerable resistance in Argentina, a country in which 
both images of Prebisch are still remembered today. 
•Professor of Economic Policy at the University of 
Buenos Aires 
Raúl Prebisch was my Professor of Political Economy 
at the University of Buenos Aires in 1948. From that 
time until the end of his life, I maintained a friendly 
and warm relationship with my former teacher, 
although it was not without disagreements concerning 
Argentine economic policy. In this article, I recall 
two periods in my relationship with Prebisch: his 
early teaching at the University of Buenos Aires and 
his work as economic advisor to the Argentine 
Government after the overthrow of Perón in 1955. 
When classes began in the academic year of 
1948, the story spread through the Economic 
Sciences Department of the University of Buenos 
Aires that Raúl Prebisch would be teaching Economic 
Dynamics again. He had withdrawn from teaching 
when he resigned as the General Manager of the 
Central Bank after the military coup of 1943. 
Prebisch's return generated an air of expectancy. 
Most of us students felt a visceral opposition to the 
conservative regimes which Prebisch had served in 
important posts. Nevertheless, his academic prestige 
placed him above the vicissitudes of political life. 
On the first day of classes, in mid-March, 
Prebisch entered the small lecture room at the 
intersection of Avenida Córdoba and Junín, facing the 
present site of the Professors' Hall. That day I 
watched the arrival of a fine-looking man, head erect, 
of medium height, in his mid-forties. His dark suit, 
white shirt and pale tie gave him an elegance that 
matched his demeanour. He stepped up onto the 
podium, looked out over his audience and began in a 
firm and steady voice: "Gentlemen, today we shall 
start a course in which I propose to present to you my 
ideas about the behaviour of the economic system 
under present-day conditions." 
Simultaneously with the course, Prebisch 
conducted a seminar which gave students a greater 
opportunity for dialogue and closer acquaintance with 
the Professor. In the first meeting of the seminar, 
Prebisch put a question to the students. He began by 
saying that he was profoundly disillusioned with the 
neoclassical thought prevalent in academic circles at 
the time, with its interpretation of problems and with 
its principles of economic policy. Then he asked: "To 
what do you attribute this reaction of mine to 
traditional economic thought?" The students 
remained silent for a few moments. Watching the 
Professor's look of expectation, I found the courage 
to reply: "Doctor", I said, "the reason must be that 
kind of thought does not help solve the problems of 
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the real world". Prebisch looked at me and answered: 
"Exactly, that's right." He went on to discuss the 
problems he had faced in shaping Argentine 
economic policy during the 1930s, especially in the 
management of the Central Bank. He explained that 
the conventional approach was incapable of 
responding to the consequences of the world crisis 
and its impact on the Argentine economy. Then, 
tentatively and without a theoretical frame of 
reference, he proceeded to search for the fiscal, 
monetary and foreign-exchange policy answers that 
would help in resolving the severe imbalance in 
external payments caused by the collapse of the 
buying power of exports and the marked decrease in 
production and employment. In practice and 
throughout this search, Prebisch promoted and 
applied compensatory policies which would prove to 
be pioneering ideas at about the same time by a 
Professor at Cambridge whose theoretical foundations 
were being laid down. Prebisch was one of the first 
economists to take note of the Keynesian revolution 
and disseminate it in Latin America. 
At the end of each meeting of the seminar, 
Prebisch left the Department and walked toward the 
corner of Callao and Charcas, the former site of our 
school. Don Raúl was always a great one for walking. 
Among the factors that explained his excellent health, 
he included walking, a form of exercise to which, 
years later, aerobic functions would be attributed. 
Prebisch knew this instinctively without the aid of the 
theories of Dr. Cooper and other specialists in the 
subject. I accompanied Prebisch many times on those 
walks. 
One of the assignments in the seminar consisted 
in preparing brief monographs. My first academic 
work in economics was assigned by Prebisch and 
consisted of a commentary on Fritz Machlup's book 
on the multiplier effect in foreign trade. The Professor 
liked my work and remarked: "You have a 
considerably larger vocabulary than most economists, 
whose knowledge of language is rather mediocre." 
Prebisch always maintained a justified concern with 
questions of style. The clarity of his own language 
helps to explain the impact of his ideas. His works 
can be understood. This is more than can bé said for 
the intellectual products of a good many of his 
colleagues, who surround the discipline with 
frequently sterile exercises reserved for the experts. 
At mid-year, the course and the seminar ended. 
Shortly thereafter, the Government again barred 
Prebisch from teaching. Thus ended his teaching 
career at the University of Buenos Aires. Prebisch 
then sought new horizons abroad which later 
established him as the most famous economist of 
Latin America and of the developing world. 
The ideas which Prebisch disseminated in his 
writings through ECLAC were first put forward in 
organic fashion at the University of Buenos Aires in 
1948. It is no accident that the renovation of 
economic theory in Latin America was begun by an 
Argentine economist. Towards the end of the 1940s 
our country was the most advanced in the region. 
With its natural and human resources, by 1930 
Argentina's economy had achieved the highest levels 
of income and international participation. Seventy 
years of growth linked to the world market had made 
it possible to involve most of the active population. 
The style of outward-looking growth had reached its 
highest level of development in Argentina during the 
years before the crisis of the 1930s. Its financial 
system was the most sophisticated, and when the 
crisis came, its capital market was more developed 
than that of any other Latin American country. 
Towards the end of the 1920s, exports accounted 
for about 25% of GDP, and imports for a similar 
share of the total demand. Such a high degree of 
international involvement made Argentina highly 
vulnerable to changes in world market activity levels 
and especially to changes in the hegemonic Power to 
which Argentina was closely tied. That instability, 
resulting from the economic cycle in the United 
Kingdom, inevitably attracted the attention of so 
acute an observer as Prebisch. Other features of the 
Argentine experience would also be decisive in 
shaping his main ideas. 
When the crisis came, Argentina was a 
sub-industrialized country, to judge by the low ratio 
of manufacturing activity to per capita income and 
population. Even so, there was considerable diversity 
in the country's productive structure and a high level 
of ability in its human resources. The development 
achieved in the country's energy, transport and 
communications infrastructure, in the industries that 
processed commodities for export (refrigeration 
plants, mills, etc.), in the machine shops, support 
services and support manufacturing for the country's 
stock of capital goods, together with the rather 
sophisticated services available in a society with a 
high average income, constituted an abundance of 
human resources and a productive system which were 
capable of more complex undertakings. At the same 
time, there were imports which could easily be 
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replaced with national products in the textile industry, 
food processing, light machinery and chemical 
enterprises and other areas requiring relatively simple 
technology and low-intensity capital. 
On the global scene, at that time, the most 
important economies were following strongly 
interventionist policies and assigning to the State 
responsibilities previously unknown in the prevalent 
liberal pattern. In the case of Argentina, the military 
coup of 1930 and the conservative regimes imposed 
through fraud and through the exclusion of majority 
political expression made it possible to suppress the 
struggles over distribution and to respond without 
much trouble to the conflicts arising from the initial 
process of import substitution. 
In this setting, one can readily understand the 
viability of a process of industrialization based on the 
domestic market and reductions in the import 
coefficient and, at the same time, the feasibility of 
keeping conflicts concerning distribution under 
control, while maintaining macroeconomic balances. 
Optimism about the prospect of transforming reality 
through public policy and of bringing about change in 
the behaviour of participants in social action was 
possible in that context. 
This message of confidence in our own capacity 
to understand the world and change it helps to explain 
the widespread acceptance of Prebisch's early ideas 
and, later, of the ECLAC model. 
That was the scene. And what kind of man was 
the man acting in it? First of all, he was a 
clear-headed man, with a profound vocation for 
analysis, willing to understand the reality around him 
in terms beyond conventional theoretical clichés. 
Moreover, Prebisch had a rich store of operational 
experience. This produced a distinctive stamp of his 
career: understand in order to act. Constantly and 
uninterruptedly, he moved forward from theoretical 
ideas to the conclusions needed to make proposals for 
economic policy. From the 1920s on, he distinguished 
himself as an astute analyst. In the 1930s, he held 
important economic policy posts, culminating in 1935 
with his assignment as General Manager of the 
recently formed Central Bank. These personal traits 
and this experience constituted the personality of the 
professor who, on that mid-March morning in 1948, 
began his discourses in the Economic Sciences 
Department of the University of Buenos Aires. 
What were Prebisch's reservations about the 
neoclassical model and its interpretation of tendencies 
in the real world of the early post-war period? What 
conclusions were to be drawn from the depression of 
the 1930s which brought about the collapse of the 
international economic order and ultimately led to the 
Second World War? What were the implications of 
the theoretical revision he set in motion? 
Until the crisis of 1930, the neoclassical 
approach had prevailed in Latin America. It 
guaranteed the balance of international payments with 
optimum use of available resources so long as 
free-trade policies were maintained. Freedom in trade 
and international payments made possible the 
exploitation of the comparative advantages arising 
from the availability of resources and ensured a 
balance in prices, interest rates and exchange rates. 
Any deviation due to imprudent policies that 
increased domestic credit and public spending 
brought about a drop in international reserves, a 
shrinking of the monetary base, a rise in the interest 
rate, a drop in demand and, eventually, the restoration 
of balance. If the initial deviations were caused by a 
change in international conditions for example, a drop 
in export prices the economy would follow the same 
course of adjustment. The system made it possible to 
absorb changes in the real income of productive 
factors and to maintain the stability of overall price 
levels. 
The initial effort to respond to the extraordinary 
events brought on by the global crisis of the 1930s 
with that theoretical scaffolding produced a disaster. 
The collapse of world trade and the crisis of the 
financial markets generated an imbalance in 
international payments which proved to be 
unmanageable with conventional policies. Attempts 
to recover the lost balance through reductions in 
spending accelerated the collapse of production and 
employment. The resulting reduction of imports was 
insufficient to offset the violent drop in exports. With 
the notable exception of Argentina, the crisis in 
international payments made unilateral decisions to 
declare foreign-debt moratoria the rule in Latin 
America. 
The 1930s burned into the collective memory of 
the region the conviction that the crisis of that decade 
was not merely another phase of the economic cycle. 
In Argentina, since the mid-1930s, attempts were 
made through foreign-exchange, fiscal and monetary 
policies to compensate for the impact of the 
contraction in exports and capital inputs on domestic 
demand, production and employment. Moreover, 
Keynes's theoretical revision, the policies of the New 
Deal and the expansion of State intervention aimed at 
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remedying the consequences of the crisis were 
gaining influence in the region. Protectionism and 
foreign-exchange controls became the general 
practice in industrialized countries. In Germany and 
Italy the crisis swept away theoretical models and 
conventional policies and also wiped out democratic 
systems. 
The Second World War provoked further 
disruptions in Latin America. The interruption of 
imports from traditional sources brought about the 
forced isolation of the region's economies. Import 
substitution was dictated by events. Each national 
economy responded on the basis of its previously 
accumulated industrial and technological capacity, 
the size of its domestic market, the response capacity 
of the public sector and the maturity of its private 
sector. 
When the war ended, 15 years of considerable 
transformations in the economic structure and 
international participation of Latin America had 
elapsed. In the rest of the world, the post-war 
reconstruction of Europe and Japan was based on 
protectionist policies and on regulations controlling 
foreign trade and international payments. The sphere 
of State action was broadened through the 
nationalization of enterprises within the financial 
sector and through income policies based on price 
and wage controls. 
By the end of the 1940s, the neoclassical 
theoretical structure that had been predominant in 
Latin America from the mid-nineteenth century until 
1930 was in ruins. With the collapse of theoretical 
models, traditional policies became discredited. At 
that time the region lacked a theory of long-term 
development and short-term balance. The gold 
standard, free trade, limits on State intervention and 
respect for the virtues of market laws could not 
withstand the onslaught of the 15 years that began in 
1930 and ended with the end of the war. 
The way was open to search for new solutions to 
the problems of development and balance. Prebisch's 
greatest contribution lay in his decision to understand 
these problems from our point of view that is, on the 
basis of the reality of what he defined soon thereafter 
as the peripheral countries. Traditionally, the 
economic universe had been studied according to 
theories generated in the centres of the international 
system. This hindered our understanding of our own 
reality and, consequently, the discovery of valid 
solutions to the problems of growth and stability. The 
cost of operating with borrowed ideas during the 
crisis years had been overwhelming. That error was 
not to be repeated. When, beginning in the 1970s, 
orthodox monetarist thought again became 
predominant in Latin America, the accuracy of 
Prebisch's ideas became evident once more. 
In 1948 Prebisch was engaged in explaining the 
behaviour of the terms of trade between the export of 
basic commodities from the periphery and the export 
of manufactured goods from the centres. In his 
judgement, this was the principal factor that shed 
light on the distribution of the fruits of technological 
progress throughout the world economy. The cause 
that explained the phenomena lay in the fact that 
manpower was more plentiful in the periphery than in 
the centres. For that reason, in industrial countries the 
increases in productivity generated by technological 
progress were held back by productive factors 
through real wages and earnings. In the periphery, on 
the other hand, those increases were transferred to 
buyers through the relatively lower prices of exports. 
The inability to increase employment to the same 
real-wage levels kept labour from sharing in the fruits 
of technological progress. This unequal relationship 
between centre and periphery cast doubt on the 
validity of the neoclassical model. At the same time, 
it revealed inequities in the distribution of the benefits 
generated by the international division of labour and 
by the comparative advantages resulting from the 
relative abundance of productive factors. 
Moreover, the gold standard and the free 
circulation of capital subjected periphery countries to 
the effects of ups and downs of the economic cycle in 
the industrial centres. The gold standard made the 
periphery impotent in the face of variations occurring 
in the central economies of the system. In those 
circumstances, the process of adjustment was painful 
and imposed high economic and social costs on the 
periphery countries. 
If this was the behaviour of the global economy, 
free-market policies caused long-term economic 
stagnation and short-term production and 
employment instability in the periphery. The frontal 
challenge to these consequences of market dynamics 
led inevitably to a rejection of the free-trade model 
and to the creation of an alternative economic policy. 
Since specialization in the production and export of 
basic commodities was incompatible with domestic 
retention of the fruits of technological progress, it was 
necessary to create other productive activities and 
sources of employment. In other words, 
industrialization was necessary. At the same time, 
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given that the free movement of capital and freedom 
in exchange rates brought about an adjustment 
process with high economic and social costs, it was 
also necessary to regulate both the exchange market 
and the movement of funds between Latin America 
and other regions. 
All this had, in fact, been happening since the 
1930s. These were the ad hoc policy responses of a 
number of Latin American countries to the problems 
arising from the global crisis. But according to 
Prebisch's revision of theory, these policies were no 
longer of a transitory nature, to be maintained until 
"normality", that is, the neoclassical universe, could 
be restored. Instead, since that time, industrialization 
and State intervention in international foreign-
exchange and in other markets became central 
economic policy objectives and instruments. From 
being temporary emergency measures, they had 
become policies aimed at transforming the country's 
production system and its participation in the 
international economy by means of direct political 
intervention in the allocation of resources. 
These early measures provoked a chain reaction. 
If industrialization was to assume the leadership 
position in development, it was necessary to study 
what had been done in other countries whose 
industrial development had come much later than that 
of the United Kingdom, the leader of the first 
industrial revolution. The experience of the United 
States, Germany, Japan and other countries was 
revealing. In every case, industrialization had been 
supported by protection of the domestic market and 
its reservation for the country's own industrial 
production. Moreover, State intervention had not 
been limited to the imposition of restrictions on 
imports that would compete with domestic 
production. It had also included other support 
instruments, in particular the financing of capital 
formation. 
Consequently, it was necessary to base 
industrialization on the domestic market and to 
extend public measures to a number of areas whose 
activities were aimed at the same target of 
industrialization. In that way, beginning in the late 
1940s, inward-looking growth was supported by 
convincing theoretical arguments and, in some 
countries, by policies which were increasingly 
divergent from the free-trade model. 
The evolution of economic policy in the main 
economies of the region reinforced tendencies that 
had been observed since the 1930s. The State 
emerged as a leading participant in the development 
process, intervening in three main areas: first, by 
raising tariffs and implementing trade controls and 
other import restrictions in order to reserve the 
domestic market for domestic products and to make 
import substitution viable; second, by improving 
transport, communications and energy infrastructures 
through increased public investment and the creation 
of State companies in those areas and, increasingly, in 
certain other basic industries requiring large capital 
investment; third, by applying subsidies and, 
especially, by manipulating relative prices in favour 
of growth industries. By the end of the 1940s, the 
principal economies of the region were armed not 
only with a theory to justify public intervention in the 
promotion of industrialization and the transformation 
of productive structures but also with an 
interventionist arsenal that exerted a powerful 
influence on the functioning of markets, the 
determination of production and income, foreign 
trade, capital formation, relative prices and income 
distribution. 
Prebisch's teachings at the University of Buenos 
Aires were optimistic in content. The efforts at 
development and the international context posed 
serious challenges, but those could be faced 
successfully on the basis of a clear diagnosis rooted in 
our own interpretations of reality. 
After Prebisch left the University, I did not see 
him until we met in early 1950 in New York, where I 
was working at the United Nations Secretariat. At that 
time Prebisch was negotiating his transfer from the 
Studies Directorate of ECLAC to the leadership of it 
Executive Secretariat. The United Nations Secretariat 
was at that time one of the powerhouses of new 
development theories and had on its staff such 
eminent economists as Michael Kalecki and Hans 
Singer. The latter, together with Prebisch, later 
sponsored the theory of the secular tendency towards 
deterioration of the terms of trade of basic 
commodities. In New York I followed ECLAC's 
pioneering research closely and published my first 
studies. One of these, relating to real wages and 
income distribution, was produced in collaboration 
with the Mexican economist Horacio Flores de la 
Peña, member of Kalecki's team. The most important 
ECLAC economists often visited the Secretariat, and 
on those occasions I established my first friendships 
and intellectual ties with Celso Furtado and other 
eminent Latin American economists. 
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In early 1953 I resigned my post at the United 
Nations and returned to Buenos Aires. 1 became 
involved in politics as a member of the Unión Cívica 
Radical, whose National Committee had as its 
Chairman a rising and talented young politician 
named Arturo Frondizi. Those were the last days of 
the first Peronist Government. The regime was 
collapsing, exhausted by the conflicts generated by its 
own policies and by the divisions existing in 
Argentine society. 
Within the party, I served as economic advisor to 
the National Committee and the group of national 
representatives led by Oscar Alende. Some other 
members of our advisory team were Norberto 
González, Federico Herschell and Samuel Itzcovich. 
We prepared various papers in support of the critical 
positions taken by the Radicals. From the standpoint 
of the theoretical model emerging in Latin America at 
that time, we criticized the irrationality of the Peronist 
income policy, the lags in investment, the inadequate 
development of infrastructure and basic industries, 
the actions taken against export activities and the 
Government's promotion of foreign-capital participa-
tion in the petroleum industry and other sectors. In 
other words, we were criticizing Peronism for being 
inconsistent with a number of its initial proposals for 
change. That criticism was made within the context of 
a rejection of Peronism's violations of democratic 
legality. Our approach represented the "national and 
popular" positions embodied by Radicalism in the 
Avellaneda Declaration of 1947^  One of the main 
exponents of that line of thought was Frondizi 
himself, whose book Petróleo y Política was part of 
the anti-imperialist and progressive current. 
These references are relevant to my second 
recollection of my relationship with Prebisch. In 
September 1955 Perón was overthrown, and shortly 
thereafter the new Government, known as the 
Government of the Liberating Revolution, summoned 
Raúl Prebisch, who was Executive Secretary of 
ECLAC at that time. Prebisch agreed to serve as 
economic advisor without assuming any executive 
responsibilities. During the final months of 1955 he 
prepared a number of reports which he submitted to 
the authorities and which became the subject of 
vigorous public debate. The first was informe 
preliminar acerca de la situación económica 
["Preliminary report on the economic situation"]. 
Later, he submitted two other papers: Moneda sana o 
inflación incontrolable ["Sound money or 
uncontrolled inflation"] and Plan de restablecimiento 
econômico ["Plan of economic restoration"]. That set 
of ideas and proposals was referred to at the time as 
the Prebisch Plan. 
Prebisch's return to the field of Argentine 
economic policy occurred in circumstances very 
different from those he had faced previously as the 
principal participant in the country's economic 
management during the 1930s and up to the military 
coup of 1943. The situation was very different for 
various reasons. In the first place, the problem of 
development was more complex than at the time of 
the collapse of the primary export model. The 
balance-of-payments crisis was primarily due not to a 
reduced capacity to cover foreign debts as a result of 
a shrinking world market but to the structural deficit 
arising from industry's orientation towards the 
domestic market and its dependence on traditional 
farm-export earnings. By 1955 industrialization, 
growth and foreign balances were considered in terms 
very different from those that Prebisch had known up 
to 1943 as administrator of economic policy. In the 
second place, the country's social and political 
realities had changed radically. The social forces 
unleashed by Peronism since the mid-1940s defined 
the struggle over distribution and short-term policy 
management in terms that were more complex and 
more difficult to deal with administratively than in the 
past. Political instability had brought a radicalization 
of positions. The traditional Right tied to farm 
production intended for export, exerted powerful 
pressures for the modification of relative prices in its 
favour, mainly through devaluations of the currency. 
At the same time, workers and other urban sectors 
sought to increase their share of overall income 
through an increase in wages and in the margins of 
industry and services profit. By 1955, the price-
wage-devaluation spiral had generated conditions that 
later came to be known as inertial inflation. Lastly, 
the State which Prebisch found in 1955 was not the 
one he had left in 1943. It was much larger, 
intervened powerfully in income distribution and 
resource allocation and suffered from a chronic 
tendency towards imbalance. 
In those circumstances, Prebisch's first concern 
was to re-establish macroeconomic balance or, in a 
well-known phrase, to put the house in order. That 
was indeed a necessary condition for the realistic 
renewal of development strategy after the overthrow 
of Perón in 1955. It is understandable that his 
proposals encountered resistance from popular 
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sectors, which felt aggrieved by the adjustment 
strategy, and from the Right, which rejected the ideas 
for transformation and industrialization that Prebisch 
had popularized in his leadership position at ECLAC. 
The Unión Cívica Radical adopted a critical 
position with respect to Prebisch's programme. We, 
the young economic advisors to the National 
Committee and to the party's representatives in the 
Junta Consultiva, whose chief delegate was Oscar 
Alende, prepared various studies which provided data 
and arguments for the party's spokesmen. Prebisch's 
approach seemed to us to be very conservative, with 
excessive emphasis on foreign adjustments, price 
stability, the virtues of foreign capital and the freer 
play of market forces. We also criticized the gaps we 
detected in structural and social questions and in 
others that would strengthen Argentina's position in 
the face of foreign interests. 
Don Raúl was perplexed by the criticism coming 
from those who had been his disciples and the 
followers of his main ideas in theoretical matters. We 
dared to suppose that, when he returned to Argentina 
to concern himself with the concrete and urgent 
problems of the nations's economy, he became once 
again the old conservative-regime functionary of the 
1930s, with his old friends and his predominant 
interests in monetary and balance-of-payments 
questions. At the same time, it was true that 
traditional conservatives also rejected the ideas he 
had developed and promoted in Argentina and 
throughout Latin America. Prebisch's positions on the 
short-term management of the Argentine economy, a 
question to which he returned several times during 
the years following 1955, reawakened the doubts of 
both his disciples and other economists who 
recognized in him a pioneer of new ideas about 
development. While in the rest of Latin America and 
in the third world Prebisch is viewed as the main 
exponent of reform thought, in Argentina his image 
retains more complex and contradictory nuances. 
. Shortly thereafter, I was assigned to the 
Argentine Embassy in London as an economic 
advisor, and in mid-1956, I was a member of the 
Argentine delegation to the United Nations Economic 
and Social Council in Geneva. Prebisch was there, 
having returned to ECLAC after leaving his post as 
economic advisor to the revolutionary Government. 
We spoke at length about the events of the past year 
and the critical position taken by the Radicals. 
Prebisch was particularly concerned about the 
criticism from the "progressive" camp. I tried to 
explain that Radicalism was seeking a new synthesis 
for integration with the popular forces of a defeated 
Peronism and an economic policy model far removed 
from orthodox recipes and based on "national and 
popular" proposals. This naturally implied short-term 
unorthodox management which, even if one 
recognized the need for fiscal balance and monetary 
prudence, was far removed from the emphasis 
Prebisch had placed on the adjustment process and 
the reincorporation of Argentina into international 
financial circles. Of course, I did not convince him. 
When his mission in Geneva ended, I went to the 
airport to see him off. I found him eating an excellent 
luncheon. When he had finished with good wine and 
a variety of cheeses, he asked for coffee and -of all 
things- saccharine! When he saw my smile, he said, 
"Don't laugh. Saccharine, like confession for 
Catholics, wipes away sin". 
In 1959, while I was serving as Minister of 
Economy and Finance in the Alende government of 
the Province of Buenos Aires, I met Prebisch again. 
Towards the end of the preceding year the Frondizi 
Government had signed an agreement with the 
International Monetary Fund and was pursuing an 
orthodox fiscal and monetary policy. There was great 
displeasure in the ranks of intransigent Radicalism. 
When we met in Buenos Aires, Don Raúl chided me: 
"Tell me, my friend, can you explain to me now why 
you criticized my proposals?" At that time, I found it 
difficult to answer. From a historical perspective it 
could be said that those decisions taken by Frondizi 
and Rogelio Frigerio were part of what would be 
described today as a "capitalist shock" for 
accumulation and growth, but that is a different 
question altogether. 
